SOE CLAIRVOYANT OPERATION

Beskrivelse

1st January 1942.

SOE Operation CLAIRVOYANT PLAN

• Ref. Maps:
• Europe Air U.E. 62/5 - 1:500,000
• Europe Air U.E. 60/4 - 1:500,500
• Europe Air U.E. 50/4 - 1:500,000
• Norway E,35 - 1:100,000
• W.Bergenhus1.2.5.4. - 1:200,000
• Stavanger S - 1:200,000
• C.33 West - 1:100,000
• Søndre Bergenhus I. - 1:200,000

1. INTRODUCTION.

This is an SOE operation against certain hydro-electric plants and ferries in Southern Norway. The operation is due to commence on 26th January 1942, with zero day 15th February 1942. There are six parties taking part; of these five must be dropped by air as their destinations are too far from the coast to enable the stores to be transported to their destination; the remaining party, whose objective is near the coast, will go by sea.

2. OBJECT.

The object of CLAIRVOYANT is to immobilize part of the industries in N0RWAY which are of vital importance to the enemy. The industries concerned depend upon certain power stations for their supply of electric power. Those power stations and certain ferries which are vital links in communications will be attacked in this operation.

3. Objectives.

TYSSEDAL - Hydro-electric power station - (Carbides)

06° 35' E. 60° 06' 54" N.

RJUKAN - Hydro-electric power stations and nitrate factories

find Heavy H.E. water
08° 34' E. 59° 55' N.

TINNSJØ - Ferries between RJUKAN and Tinoset Railhead.

BJØLVEFOSS - Hydro-electric power station - (Ferro alloys and aluminium)

06° 23' E. 60° 26" N.

HØYANGER - Hydro-electric power stations - (Aluminium Oxide and Metal)

06° 04' 15" E. 61° 13' 21"

SAUDA - Hydro-electric power stations - (Ferro alloys and aluminium)

06° 23'E. 59° 30' N.

STANGFJORD- Hydro-electric- power station - (Aluminium)

05° 11'E. 61° 27' N.

4. Result of Operation.

The result of these attacks, If competely successful, will mean the stopping of the following estimated percentages of

Norwegian production for a period of up to 6 months .

• Aluminium Oxide - 100%
• Aluminium Metal - 100%
• Carbide - 65-70 10%
• Ferro-Alloy - 25%
• Heavy Water (H2O2) - 100% Hydrogen and
• Oxygon Supply - 90%

5. Outline of Operation.
a. Airborne parties RJUKAN and TINNSJØ Ferries

• TYSS0
• HØYANGER
• BJØLVEFOSS
• SAUDA
• Boat Party: - STANGFJ0RD

6. Method of Attack.

a. Hydro-electric Plants. The most vulnerable part of these plants is the penstock pipe line. The power plants are all high head plants and the pine lines are easily approached. In each case the steel pipe lines will be cut with high explosives and the automatic closing valves at the top of the pipe line put out of action. By this combined operation it is expected that in certain cases a continuous flow of water under high pressure will pour down the hillside causing great destruction to the factories below. The HØYANGER pipe line however can only be attacked on a plateau whore this final result will not occur.

The operation in each case is carried out by a small number of men who approach tho pipe lines and valve houses under cover of darkness lay charges with time fuses.

b. Ferries. The 3 rail ferries between the RJUKAN Valley and the railhead will be attacked with magnetic devices holding H.E. and set off with time delays. The lake is too deep to permit salvage, the only alternative route is by indifferent road connection.

c. RJUKAN. The power station In the RJUKAN Valley (VEMORK and SAARHEIM) are too largo to be attackod efficiently in the same manner as the others. It Is suggested that a party of 3 men should lay out remote control flares, operated by W/T, on the mountains above the valley, thereby
indlcating the target area to the R.A.F. and that this installation should be engaged by bombing alone.

7. Syncronosations

a. Synchronosation of tho attack and thus surprise will increase very much the chances of success. If the attachs are not synchronised there is the danger that guards will be increased before later parties can come into action.

b. Synchronisation can only be achieved if the parties reach their first destination in Norway more or less simultaneously and with their full equipment, i.e. explosives, rations, etc.

8. Means of airtransport.

a. Parties to be transported by air are large; they consist of tho following

Party Target. Men 'A. Type Chutes Cont/P'keges
( 1 RJUKAN 3 1 4 3
( 2 TYSSO 3 1 6 4
( 3 BJØLVEFOSS 3 1 3 3
( 4 HØYANGER 5 1 5 4
( 5 SAUDA 5 1 8 4

The distance if the objective necessitates a long range aircraft. Long range Whitley's cannot be used as it is impossible to drop through the door (which is these aircraft is the only exit possible owing to extra tankage in the fuselage) the numbers of men and quantities of equipment required.

b. A Halifax aircraft is therefore the only type which can satisfactorily carry out the task. One such aircraft can transport two of the parties referred to above plus all their stores, thereby reducing the total requirements to 3 sorties.

c. In order to archieve the essential factor of synchronisation referred to above, all these sorties must be made on the same night. Three Halifax aircraft are therefore required, although if only two were available four out of the five parties could be transported simultaneously and the operation would not be entirely prejudiced; the possibility of bad weather intervening may, however, entail the cancellation of the last party.

d. 138 Squadron with which S.O.E. normally work can produce only one Halifax aircraft unless all other long range work for which these aircraft were intended and which is of a very urgent nature is to be held up. It will therefore be necessary that the remaining two or, at least, one aircraft be provided from some other source.

9. R.A.F. CO-OPERATION REQUIRED

Cover for the Operation.

A large aircraft circling low in the neighbourhood of important but isolated targets would not escape detection and would suggest the dropping of parachutists. To avoid this danger there should be a certain amount of bombing of other targets in those areas. It is suggested that targets night be power station not taken on by this operation; or other targets, e.g.

HERØYA 09° 40' E. 59° 07' N.
PORSGRUND 09° 40' E. 59° 08' N.
EYDEHAMN 06° 53' E. 58° 28' N.
KRISTIANSAND 03° 02' E. 58° 08' N.
ORKLABRUBEN 09° 50' E. 63° 16' N.
KNABEN 06° 59' L. 53° 40' N
AARDAL (Farnes) 07° 50' E. 61° 19' N.

10. Bombing of RJUKAN

If it is agreed that the destruction of the targets in the RJUKAN Valley should be undertaken by bombing a second bombing sortie will have to be arranged over the RJUKAN Valley within 14 asys of the dropping operation, owing to the length of life of the accumulators for the remote control flares placed by the party concerned.

11. CONCLUSION.

It la submitted that the importance of these objectives is sufficient to warrant the employment (Including temporary modification) of two Halifax aircraft. Unless this allotment of aircraft can be made, it does not appear to be possible to carry out this operation. The aircraft will be required to be ready to operate after modification during the period 24th January - 4th February.

1st January 1942.